Bibliography references | Computer Science homework help

2. Identified Gaps and Recommendations

The success of resilience with effective Disaster Recovery (DR), Business Continuity (BC), and Continuity of operations Planning (COOP) however depends not only on the presence of strategies but also their integration, implementation and improvement. Even with knowledge of these frameworks, most organizations lack execution, leaving them open to operational disruption and legal and data breaches. a. Gaps in Integration and Framework Adoption. One of the critical shortcomings of DR and BC planning is the failure of organizations to embrace proven frameworks, such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-34, to achieve a full implementation of these frameworks. Although this framework has a complete framework that can be used for the development of effective contingency plans and their maintenance, many of the businesses just implement it on a surface level or disregard its implementation completely. Recovery and continuity efforts, however, tend to be fragmented – with different departments each managing DR, BC, IT security and compliance in silos. This approach weakens coordination and makes response plans ineffective in crises. Lacking a unified strategy, organizations find themselves unprepared to manage cascading failures such as cyberattack –data breach, operational stop, and regulatory fine. As Ostadi et al. (2023) point out, real process resilience presupposes combining risk management, IT governance, and security planning. In order to close this gap, organizations should deploy a holistic operational resilience framework that is consistent to standards such as NIST SP 800-34 or ISO 22301. Consistent audits and cross functional continuity committees can guarantee that disaster recovery strategies not only are developed but are dynamic, relevant and integrated with overall risk management objectives. b. Weak Access Management Practices Access control is an important part of secure and effective DR and BC systems, but poor practices in this field remain a problem for organizations. The most common problem is the tendency to use outdated, or too permissive ACLs, which do not limit data access to only those authorized to access it. This is often the case of over-privileged accounts, a major vulnerability both internal and external attackers take advantage of. Failure to enforce access control policies in DR environments has the tendency to lower security thresholds favoring unauthorized entry in sensitive recovery processes, as indicated by Nurhanudin (2021). RBAC on the other hand provides a more granular secure model of accessing resources in that permissions are granted through job roles instead of individual. Further, the addition of Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) is an extremely important aspect of identity verification especially when performing high risk activities such as system recovery or data migration. Organizations should also ensure log of access attempt and monitoring. Periodic reviews of access logs in conjunction with user access recertification can detect anomalies or breaches that would normally remain undetected. Such practices strengthen the DR environment and provide compliance to cybersecurity regulations. c. Network Security Shortcomings The backbone of operational continuity is network security, but most organizations do not invest enough into this area. Lacking robust protections, the networks themselves that support disaster recovery systems can become vectors. For example, poorly segmented networks provide simple avenues for malware or attackers to move laterally, which could well result in a backup system or recovery tools being compromised during an incident. Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) is one of the presented models where there is no implicit trust, even inside the periphery of the network. Each user and device needs a constant authentication and authorization before accessing the resources. This decreases the level of intrusions as well as enhances the security posture of the organization in the primary and the backup environment. Besides ZTA, organizations need to implement network segmentation to segregate the critical assets and stop the spread of the threats. Firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDS) and continuous monitoring of the network are also needed. According to Corrales-Estrada et al. (2021) resilience capabilities can be much improved if the organizations invest in real time network visibility tools that can detect suspicious activities and vulnerabilities while they are still in their infancy. Consequently, proactive network security practices form the basis of any successful DR or COOP plan. d. Limited Training and Cultural Engagement Technical safeguards are insufficient to assure continuity of business. Misunderstands, human error, and lack of preparedness are standard causes of operational failings during emergencies. One of the major gaps highlighted in the literature is the absence of all-round employee training and involvement in continuity planning. Unfortunately, in many cases continuity plans are drafted by a small committee, which is beyond the reach or unknown to most of the staff. To solve this problem, organizations need to hold regular training sessions, simulation exercises and tabletop drills that involve staff from all departments and level. These activities enable employees to know what they are required to do and reset coordinated response in a controlled environment. Feedback obtained from conducting such drills may identify loopholes in the continuity plan, and should therefore be used otherwise modified accordingly. Additionally, leadership need to create a culture of preparedness by focusing on the importance of continuity planning as an aspect of operations. Sawalha (2020) accented the importance of not only the right tools, but also the right organizational mindset. Implementing continuity values in organizational culture prevents DR and BC from being treated as IT-only issues but offers a concerted effort important to business survival. e. Legal and Policy Clarity Another less spoken about but equally important issue under consideration is the absence of legal and policy clarity on access rights and responsibilities in continuity environments. Ambiguities in the definition of such terms as “authorized access”, “privileged user”, or “system administrator” can cause misunderstandings and policy violation and yet result in legal conditions after an incident. Organizations require well documented policies that define user roles and access permission, and acceptable behavior especially emergency situations where the normal procedure can be ignored. Such policies should be shaped with the assistance of legal, compliance, and cybersecurity experts so that such policies could correspond to the national regulations, e.g. GDPR, HIPAA, or the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC). In addition, continuity policies should specify accountability arrangements, specifying who is to activate plans, grant emergency access, and document what has been done during recovery. Barnett-Quaicoo and Ahmadu (2021) state that in developing regions where infrastructure risk is high, poorly defined access policies increase operational vulnerabilities. Therefore, the use of clear legal language and accountability protocols is important for execution as well as post incident analysis of recovery strategies.

Conclusion

Access control, ACLs, and network security are not a stand-alone element, but organic elements of a unified approach to disaster recovery, business continuity and continuity of operations. The literature reviewed confirms the idea that these components should function in a coordinated manner to achieve organizational resilience. Even with technological and awareness gains, policy integration gaps, training gaps, and security gaps in infrastructure still exist. By embracing a unified process resilience model, concordant with international frameworks and establishing a culture of preparedness, organizations will be better able to withstand disruptions and operate core operations. In an era where digital transformation and cyber threats walk hand in hand, the world requires more than ever a strong, adaptive, and adequately integrated DR, BC, and COOP strategies. Such organizations that will proactively take care of these areas will be in a better position to get around crises and come out stronger.

References

Kesa, D. M. (2023). Ensuring resilience: Integrating IT disaster recovery planning and business continuity for sustainable information technology operations. World Journal of Advanced Research and Reviews, 18(3), 970-992. Barnett-Quaicoo, P., & Ahmadu, A. (2021). Business continuity and disaster recovery in Ghana–a literature review. Continuity & Resilience Review, 3(2), 104–118. Corrales-Estrada, A. M., Gómez-Santos, L. L., Bernal-Torres, C. A., & Rodriguez-López, J. E. (2021). Sustainability and resilience organizational capabilities to enhance business continuity management: A literature review. Sustainability, 13(15), 8196. Nurhanudin, N. (2021). Designing a Disaster Recovery Plan Using NIST 800-34 Framework. JURNAL SISFOTEK GLOBAL, 11(2), 75–81. Ostadi, B., Ebrahimi-Sadrabadi, M., Sepehri, M. M., & Husseinzadeh Kashan, A. (2023). A systematic literature review of organization resilience, business continuity, and risk: towards process resilience and continuity. Interdisciplinary Journal of Management Studies, 16(1), 229–257. Russo, N., Mamede, H. S., Reis, L., Martins, J., & Branco, F. (2023). Exploring a Multidisciplinary Assessment of Organisational Maturity in Business Continuity. Applied Sciences, 13(21), 11846. Sawalha, I. H. (2021). Views on business continuity and disaster recovery. International Journal of Emergency Services, 10(3), 351-365. Gupta, S., Tuunanen, T., Kar, A. K., & Modgil, S. (2023). Managing digital knowledge for ensuring business efficiency and continuity. Journal of Knowledge Management, 27(2), 245-263. Sawalha, I. H. (2021). Business continuity management: Strategic management and risk implications. Widianti, A., et al. (2024). Virtual Network Protection in Crisis Management.

• Acct Help
• GPO Assistance
• COM/220 Assignment: Bias, Rhetorical Devices, and Argumentation Week One
• nicholas
• STR 581 Week 6 Final Strategic Plan Create the Final Strategic Plan. The Final Strategic Plan contains the elements of all the previous weeks' components and incorporates instructor feedback.The strategic recommendations of the individual team members wil
• Needed asap
• Cover letter reflection
• Question 11
• See Decription
• want a report with 20 pages of implementation of ISA Server in windows 2012 step by step with pictures of the steps. If you don't know or you don't have any ideas about that please do not talk to me !